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Appellant has not relied on any statutory or 
case authority in support of this brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his opening brief, appellant carefully set forth 
each of the challenged findings and showed that the trial court's 
decision to give appellee custody of the parties' three minor 
children is not rationally supported by the evidence adduced at 
trial. 
In response, appellee repeats these unsupported 
findings without providing substantive citations to the record to 
defend them. For example, appellant repeats finding 10, that 
"[appellant] stated that his work schedule was unpredictable." 
Brief of Appellee at p. 6 (citing R. 2952-56, 3029-30, 3346-51, 
33 70). The fourteen pages of citations given by appellee do not 
support this statement. As discussed in Appellant's Brief at 
page 18, appellant never said his work schedule was 
"unpredictable." Rather, it was appellee who testified that her 
schedule was "very erratic," R. 3428, while appellant testified 
that his was totally at his discretion, R. 3009. The error 
illustrated in this finding typifies the other challenged 
findings; the Court simply ignored the evidence presented and 
abused its discretion in failing to enter findings that were 
rationally supported by the evidence. 
Appellee also misstates the record, such as by claiming 
that Dr. Strassberg admitted the MMPI can be manipulated, 
implying that appellant manipulated his MMPI test. Brief of 
Appellee at p. 7. Dr. Strassberg did say that the test can be 
manipulated, but his entire statement reveals an entirely 
different focus: 
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It's fairly easy to manipulate, but quite 
difficult to do and not get caught at it. 
The test is, while transparent in some re-
spects, is quite nontransparent in a number 
of others. I routinely ... have my graduate 
students try to fake on the MMPI or MMPI II, 
and not get caught.... [It's] almost impos-
sible for most of them to manage it. It 
would take somebody who was quite familiar 
with the test, not just that the test exists, 
or what some of the items on the test are, 
but would have to be quite familiar with the 
scoring of it to effectively manipulate such 
as to fool an experienced clinician. 
R. 3174-75. 
There was no evidence that appellant had any 
familiarity with the MMPI II, or that he attempted to manipulate 
it. Rather, the evidence was that appellee, consistent with her 
dishonest and manipulative personality profile, attempted to 
manipulate the test and got caught at it. Like virtually every 
finding, however, the Court accepted, without question, Elizabeth 
Stewart's sixteen-month-old decision to reject appellant's normal 
psychiatric profile and appellee's disturbed profile in order to 
reach a decision completely at odds with the parties' conduct and 
history throughout this matter. This was an abuse of judicial 
discretion. 
Similarly, appellee suggests, without any substantive 
evidence, that the court held "several sidebar conferences" to 
advise counsel that defendant "needed to be more under control." 
This is simply false. Such claims should be given no 
consideration by the Court, except to the extent they bear on 
appellee's credibility. Appellee points to a single admonishment 
by the Court to defendant, after he unconsciously shook his head 
in response to a question posed to another physician, and to a 
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single incident where appellant was confused by a question posed 
by appellee's counsel, in a thinly veiled effort to again call 
appellant's stability into question. Such tactics should not be 
condoned by the Court, particularly where there is competent 
evidence on the record to refute such accusations. R. 2736, 
2749, 2768 (Dr. Susan Mirow, the psychiatrist who saw appellant 
sixteen times, testified that he is emotionally "quite healthy," 
and that he is a thoughtful, interactive parent that is "quite 
adept" at reaching other people emotionally). 
Appellee also claims that appellant has failed to 
marshal the evidence, and that, in any respect, the trial court's 
decision should be affirmed. In preparing his brief, appellant 
carefully searched the record with respect to every challenged 
finding and set forth the testimony or evidence that supports 
each one. Where no evidence exists, appellant has so indicated. 
Some of the challenged findings are supported only by the stale, 
badly flawed custody evaluation of Elizabeth Stewart, and 
appellant has shown or referred to those portions of the custody 
evaluation that support those findings. All of the challenged 
findings are so outweighed by competent, current evidence and 
testimony that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion 
in making them. 
The record shows that appellee, a psychiatric nurse 
with a long, well-documented history of emotional disorders, 
carefully planned and orchestrated this divorce with a continual 
pattern of treachery calculated to cast doubt on appellant's 
integrity and emotional stability. Appellant, by questioning 
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appellee's veracity and Dr. Stewart's competence at a custodial 
interview, alienated himself to Dr. Stewart, with the result 
being a carte blanch acceptance by Dr. Stewart of virtually 
everything appellee told her. 
Sixteen months later, when Dr. Stewart's predictions 
were already proving themselves wrong, Dr. Stewart's report was 
accepted blindly by the trial court without considering the 
evidence presented over six days of testimony. The result was 
that three young children, the oldest of whom appellee threatened 
to "make sick," are in the custody of a woman that clearly lacks 
the skills, or the desire, to care for them beyond meeting their 
basis physical needs, and then only with extraordinary levels of 
surrogate care. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant has properly marshalled the evidence. 
In challenging appellant's marshalling of evidence, appellee 
provides "shotgun" citations to the record and then urges the 
Court to "compare Susan's cites with Andrew's cites." A review 
of appellee's cites reveals that most have nothing to do with the 
findings they supposedly support. Following his recitation of 
each challenged finding, appellant carefully listed the evidence 
that would tend to support it. He then showed that each finding 
was contrary to the great weight of the evidence and why the 
challenged finding represented an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. In doing so he has carried his burden of marshalling 
the evidence. 
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2. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
custody of the parties1 minor children to appellee. 
Appellee relies, like the trial court, on the opinions 
and statements contained in Elizabeth Stewart's report to support 
the trial court's findings. Dr. Stewart's report, which resulted 
from two brief interviews in the summer of 1993, was seriously 
flawed when it was prepared, and it was sixteen months old by the 
time of trial. Even Dr. Stewart admitted that "the issue of 
custody should be based on current function." R. 3133. Because 
the Stewart Report served as the basis for many of the Court's 
findings, appellant devoted a substantial portion of his brief to 
illustrating the deficiencies and errors it contains. Rather 
than reiterating these points, the Court is urged to review 
appellant's opening brief, particularly the discussion of the 
Stewart Report at pp. 22-31. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has carried his burden in showing that the 
trial court utterly failed to consider the best interests of the 
parties' three minor children by placing them in the custody of 
appellee. Such a decision was a manifest abuse of judicial 
discretion, and it must be reversed. 
DATED this ^ day of August 1995. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
BA^BKRA K. POLICE^ 
JAMEE H. WOODALL 
Attorney for appellant 
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